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QUADERNI DI DIRITTO E POLITICA ECCLESIASTICA  / n. 1, aprile 2018
Religious Freedom in Canada
A Crucible for Constitutionalism
by Benjamin L. Berger*
This article examines three axes around which contemporary Canadian debates on free-
dom of religion are turning: the status and protection of group and collective religious 
interests; the emergence – and instability – of state neutrality as the governing ideal in 
the management of religious difference; and the treatment of Indigenous religion. Each 
is discussed as a key thematic and doctrinal development emerging from recent activity 
in the freedom of religion jurisprudence in Canada.  Each is also an instance, the article 
suggests, of religion doing its particularly effective work of exposing the fundamental 
tensions and dynamics in Canadian constitutionalism more generally. 
Keywords: religious freedom, Canada, collective, neutrality, Indigenous peoples
suMMary: 1. Introduction. – 2. Key Developments in Religious Freedom in Canada. – 2.1. Individua-
lism and the Re-emergence of the Collective. – 2.2. The Rise – and Instability – of State Neutrality. 
– 2.3. Indigenous Peoples, Religion, and Sovereignty. – 3. Conclusion.
1. Introduction
To reflect on the status, treatment, and role of religion has always been 
an avenue into understanding the deeper tensions, ideologies, and politics 
at work in the Canadian state, and the history, logic, and politics of its 
constitutional order. Religion was imbricated in the origins of the country 
in a way that means that Canadian constitutionalism has never embraced 
the strict separationist or non-establishment tradition of its neighbor 
to the south. Canada’s earliest constitutional documents, including the 
Treaty of Paris (France, Britain, and Spain, 10 February 1763) and the 
Quebec Act, 1774 ((UK), 14 Geo III, c 83) acknowledged the political 
and practical realities of British rule over a substantial French Catholic 
* The author wishes to thank Jamie Shilton for his superb research assistance in the 
preparation of this article.
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population with specific protections and rights extended to Roman 
Catholics and the Roman Catholic Church in Canada (Berger 2015; Epp 
Buckingham 2014). These protections would find expression in the form 
of denominational education rights in Canada’s first written constitution, 
the British North America Act, 1867 (UK, 30 & 31 Vict, c 3), rights that 
persist to this day. The formative relationship between French and English 
communities was refracted through their constitutive religious identities 
and interests, and the legacy of those origins is a political and legal space 
in Canada that resists easy claims about an «Atlantic Divide» (Whitman 
2008) in approaches to the separation of church and state.  
There have, of course, been profound constitutional and societal 
changes since these early days in the history of the country. Over this 
period of Canadian history there has been a diminishment in the overt 
role of religion in the structures of state authority. Nowhere is this more 
evident than in Quebec, where the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s has led 
to a fundamental repositioning of the Catholic Church in the province’s 
politics and culture. Today, Canadian political and legal space is also 
famously characterized by profound religious and cultural diversity that 
has been met with a stance of official multiculturalism that counsels tol-
eration and accommodation as the appropriate posture towards religious 
difference (Jedwab 2003; Kymlicka 2003). And with the introduction of 
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, the frame of constitutional 
regard for individual and community rights and interests in Canada was 
radically expanded. Religion and religious freedom would now be but 
one constitutionally recognized interest amongst many.  
Yet a central role for religion in Canadian constitutionalism persists. 
After early years under the Charter in which the jurisprudence under 
section 2(a) – the right to freedom of conscience and religion – was for-
mative but relatively sparse, the last 10-15 years have seen an explosion 
of freedom of religion cases. Canadian religious freedom jurisprudence 
has shifted and evolved in response, with the Supreme Court of Canada 
seeking to navigate many of the core problematics that bedevil the adju-
dication of religious freedom wherever it takes place. One purpose of this 
brief article is to canvass some of the key developments and debates that 
have emerged from this frenetic activity in freedom of religion in Canada. 
But there is another story told here: what we see when we look at 
these developments is that in Canada, as elsewhere in the world, freedom 
of religion is still serving as a singularly valuable site for the disclosure 
of the deeper challenges, politics, and paradoxes of constitutionalism at 
large. Freedom of religion turns out to be a crucible for constitutionalism 
more generally. The themes that are discussed in the following sections 
are, thus, not only key axes in the doctrinal and jurisprudential debate 
around freedom of religion in Canada; they are also instances of religion 
doing its peculiarly effective work of drawing our attention to the tensions 
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that affect and afflict contemporary Canadian constitutional law more 
generally (for more extensive treatment of this idea see Berger 2017).
2. Key Developments in Religious Freedom in Canada
2.1. Individualism and the Re-emergence of the Collective
One such fundamental tension is the dynamic between the individual 
and the group. The tendency of liberal constitutionalism is to «pixelate» 
human experience, focusing on the individual as the primary unit of 
constitutional regard and analysis. This tendency has shaped Canadian 
freedom of religion jurisprudence and the effects on the area have been 
the subject of substantial scholarly and jurisprudential critique (Kislowicz 
2013; Muñiz-Fraticelli 2014; Berger 2015; Newman 2016). But in recent 
years the Supreme Court has made tentative moves to open more space 
for the collective and group interests involved in religious freedom; we 
have witnessed something of a re-emergence of the collective.
To be sure, notes of regard for the collective dimensions of religious 
life have long been present in Canadian thinking about freedom of reli-
gion. Pre-Charter jurisprudence referred to religious liberty as «at once 
the necessary attributes and modes of self-expression of human beings 
and the primary conditions of their community life within a legal order» 
(Saumur v City of Quebec, [1953] 2 SCR 299 at 329), and, as discussed 
above, there are group protections for religion in the form of certain edu-
cation rights for denominational schooling. But in the post-Charter section 
2(a) jurisprudence, the overwhelming tendency has been to prioritize the 
individual and his or her personal religious freedom, rather than – and 
sometimes at the expense of – understanding religion as inherently tied 
to communities and collectivities.
The path was laid out in the touchstone post-Charter case on section 
2(a), R v Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 SCR 295, in which Justice Dickson 
explained that «[w]ith the Charter, it [had] become the right of every 
Canadian to work out for himself or herself what his or her religious 
obligations, if any, should be» (351). But the individualist rendering of 
religious freedom was doctrinally solidified in Syndicat Northcrest v Am-
selem, 2004 SCC 47, in which the Court adopted its subjective sincerity 
test for section 2(a). Focusing on religion as being, in essence, «about free-
ly and deeply held personal convictions or beliefs» (para 39), the Court 
held that to gain access to the protection of section 2(a), a claimant need 
only «demonstrate that he or she sincerely believes in a practice or belief 
that has a nexus with religion» (para 65). The practice or belief need not 
accord with the dogma or positions of religious officials or communities; 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3269555 
114 BENJAMIN L. BERGER
if this subjective sincerity exists, section 2(a) protects against non-trivial 
interferences with those practices and beliefs.  
A series of cases bear the imprint of this atomism, but the high-water 
mark came with the Court’s decision in Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of 
Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37, in which a small Hutterite community 
objected that the requirement for a photograph on their drivers’ licenses 
unjustifiably offended their right to religious freedom. Though she ac-
cepted that religion has a «collective aspect», Chief Justice McLachlin 
explained that the «broader impact of the photo requirement on the 
Wilson Colony community» did not «transform the essential claim […] 
into an assertion of a group right» (para 31). Despite a forceful dissent 
that would have laid substantial weight on the collective dimensions of 
the claim, in the majority’s hands the group religious interests at play in 
the case became simply «costs» associated with the limitation on the right, 
to be weighed against the benefits of the universal photo requirement to 
society at large (Berger 2010; Moon 2010; Weinrib 2011).  
The solicitousness for the individual’s beliefs and choices that we 
have seen in the Charter protection of religion is to be expected: liberal 
constitutionalism sees the individual far more clearly than it does the 
group, treating the individual as the primary unit of constitutional analysis 
(Berger 2015, 66-78; Bakan 1997). But an insistent individualism in the 
legal understanding of religion effaces significant dimensions of religion 
as experienced and lived outside the courtroom. Religion troubles the 
law’s individualism; phenomenologically, much of what gets categorized 
as religion has an irrepressibly collective dimension and is anchored in the 
lives of communities. Even when framed by a priority on the individual, 
religion cannot really be analyzed or understood without regard for the 
communities in which it is lived and that sustain it over time.
And so a case would eventually emerge in the section 2(a) jurispru-
dence in which the Court would seek to find space for constitutional 
regard for the collective dimensions of religion. The central question 
in Loyola High School v Quebec (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 12, was 
how the provincially mandated «ethics and religious culture» program 
applied in the context of a private Catholic high school. The program 
prescribed a curriculum that exposed students to the beliefs and ethics 
of different world religions and required that the instruction on these 
topics be conducted from a «neutral and objective perspective». Loyola 
objected that requiring a Catholic school to teach about Catholicism 
and the ethics of other traditions in a «neutral way» impaired religious 
freedom. In finding that Loyola could not be compelled by the state 
to teach about Catholicism in particular ways, Justice Abella, writing 
for the majority, explained that «[r]eligious freedom under the Charter 
must […] account for the socially embedded nature of religious belief, 
and the deep linkages between this belief and its manifestation through 
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communal institutions and traditions» (para 60). She acknowledged that 
«these collective aspects of religious freedom – in this case, the collective 
manifestation and transmission of Catholic beliefs through a private de-
nominational school – [were] a crucial part of Loyola’s claim» (para 61).
Loyola is the strongest statement from the Court recognizing the 
collective and group aspects of religious freedom1. And yet there re-
mains substantial uncertainty about what the nature and scope of this 
recognition and what it will mean for religious freedom claims on the 
part of groups and institutions (Chan 2017). How truly independent of 
the Charter’s traditional focus on the individual is the protection of these 
«collective aspects»? Justice Abella’s account of the collective aspects of 
religion is that they are «manifestations» of individual religious belief and 
she frames the liberty interests involved as those of the «members of the 
community», not the group itself. The collective dimension is indexed 
to the individual: she explains the need to give weight to the collective 
on the grounds that «individuals may sometimes require a legal entity in 
order to give effect to the constitutionally protected communal aspects 
of their religious beliefs and practices» (para 33). And how robust is this 
regard for the collective? Diagnostically, the key test will come when the 
collective religious interests are at odds with the individual’s religious 
freedom. 
We are in an interesting moment in the development of Canadian 
religious freedom jurisprudence, wrestling with and wondering what 
it means to give regard to the collective, communal, and institutional 
aspects of religious freedom. And we watch as other countries explore 
the implications of the granting of collective and corporate religious 
rights2 – a so-called «corporate turn» in religious freedom jurisprudence 
(Schwartzman, Flanders, and Robinson 2016, xiii). Some have found it 
useful to think about the individual, private, and choice-based under-
standing of religion evidenced in religious freedom jurisprudence as a 
«protestant» approach to the kind of religion that attracts constitutional 
protection (Berger 2015, 100–101; Sullivan 2005, 7–8). If that is an edi-
fying framing, one wonders whether the renaissance of the group marks 
a tentative «catholic turn» in religious freedom in Canada.
1 Indeed, the minority decision in Loyola would have gone even further, holding 
that religious organizations themselves could enjoy religious freedom under section 2(a).
2 See, e.g., the US experience discussed in Hosanna-Tabor v EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 
(2012); Burwell v Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
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2.2. The Rise – and Instability – of State Neutrality 
Recent years have seen an intriguing shift in the concepts that anchor 
the Canadian approach to religious freedom: the ascendancy of a govern-
ing principle of state neutrality, arguably dethroning notions of toleration 
(Berger 2014). The seeds of this ideal of state neutrality in Canada were 
planted in the Court’s first discussion of section 2(a) in Big M, but the 
first two decades of freedom of religion jurisprudence tended to focus 
heavily on notions of toleration as grounding the constitutional posture 
towards religion. This development in fact tracks a transnational phe-
nomenon in freedom of religion: across varied legal orders, the concept 
of state neutrality has settled in as the regulative ideal in the constitutional 
management of religion3. But – in Canada, as elsewhere – as the legal em-
phasis on state neutrality emerges, so too does an increased awareness of 
its instability and, with this, of the deeper problematics that characterize 
the interaction of religious difference and the liberal constitutional state.
The case that most clearly and forcefully announced the ascendancy 
of this principle of state neutrality was Mouvement laïque québécois v 
Saguenay (City), 2015 SCC 16. In Saguenay, an organization seeking the 
«complete secularization of the state in Quebec» (para 9) challenged a 
local practice of opening municipal council meetings with a discernibly 
Christian prayer. The Court found that the practice breached the state’s 
duty of neutrality in religious matters, which, though not explicitly im-
posed by the Charter, «has become a necessary consequence of enshrining 
the freedom of conscience and religion» (para 76). Justice Gascon ex-
plained that «the state is required to act in a manner that is respectful of 
every person’s freedom of conscience and religion» and that the «corollary 
is that the state must remain neutral in matters involving this freedom» 
(para 1). The Court described this duty of state neutrality as requiring 
«that the state neither favour nor hinder any particular belief, and the 
same holds true for non-belief […]. It requires that the state abstain from 
taking any position and thus avoid adhering to a particular belief» (para 
72). Because the prayer in question «resulted in a distinction, exclusion 
and preference based on religion» (para 120), it breached the duty of 
state neutrality.
The appeal of a duty or principle of state neutrality as the governing 
ideal for the management of religious difference is clear: «It rhetorically 
positions law outside the ‘us’ and ‘them’ of political conflict; it casts law 
in the role of disinterested conciliator rather than boundary-setter; and 
its invocation relieves the legal system of the burden of its own cultural 
and historical contingency» (Berger 2014, 119). Of course, the duty 
3 See, e.g. Leyla Sahin v Turkey ECHR 2005-XI 819, 44 EHRR 5; Lautsi and Others 
v Italy ECHR 2011-III 2412, 54 EHRR 3; Dahlab v Switzerland ECHR 2001-V 449.
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of state neutrality reflects some important principles and aspirations 
regarding even-handedness and equality as between individuals and 
groups irrespective of religious belief (Ryder 2005; Moon 2014, 19-24). 
Yet the ambition for depoliticization through adherence to this standard 
of state neutrality – that it will extract law from history and politics in 
matters of religion – is consistently and necessarily frustrated, collapsing 
in ways that gesture evocatively to the character of the constitutional 
project more generally.  
Cases about prayer and historical symbols show one way in which 
this frustration occurs. The political institutions and constitutions of 
the modern state are thick with the deposits of their religious histories. 
However, in Saguenay, Justice Gascon made clear that «the state’s duty 
of neutrality does not require it to abstain from celebrating and preserv-
ing its religious heritage» (para 116). Translating these artefacts of the 
state’s relationship with particular religions into matters of heritage and 
culture legally insulates them from the demands of state neutrality, but 
their presence and preservation is a reminder that the liberal state and its 
constitution are more religiously particular and historically conditioned 
than the language of «state neutrality» seeks to communicate.
But a clear-eyed reflection on the character of religion itself unsettles 
and frustrates the ideal of state neutrality in matters of religion in a more 
foundational way. For all its virtues, the cogency of a duty of state neutral-
ity floats on a naïve confidence in the divisibility of «matters involving» 
religion and those of a civic nature (Berger and Moon 2016, 6). However, 
no such neat distinction can be drawn. If one understands religion as 
a normative and cultural system that produces claims about ethics, has 
implications for conduct, and advances a vision of a good society, religion 
will have much to say about matters of broad public policy import. The 
state’s inescapable adoption of positions on such matters will thus involve 
position-taking on matters of deep religious interest. We have seen this 
in Canada as it relates to questions of abortion, same-sex marriage, med-
ically-assisted dying, and civic education to name just a few, matters on 
which the necessity of adopting a constitutional position is experienced 
by some communities as position-taking on matters of religion. This is 
not the result of not yet getting the approach to and definition of state 
neutrality «right». It is a reflection of the reality that state neutrality, 
understood as abstention on position-taking, is dependent on a legal 
view of the nature of religion that fails; and in failing, it consigns the 
legal demand for state neutrality to inconsistency and paradox. Faced 
with this, the Court has conceded what it must: that «the state always has 
a legitimate interest in promoting and protecting» values like equality, 
human rights and democracy (Loyola, para 47). But each of these values 
and controversies is a ground for interpretation, debate, and contestation 
about which religion might have much to say. Whatever state neutrality 
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may mean, it does not mean that the state must be neutral about the 
nature of a good society.
What begins, then, as troubling the ideal of state neutrality as an 
adequate response to the deeper dynamics involved in the relationship 
between law and religion becomes a way into something of broader, 
more general, constitutional import. The conundrums of pursuing state 
neutrality in matters of religion end up disclosing the particular and 
normative character of liberal constitutionalism and the state that it con-
stitutes. The protection of freedom of religion becomes an important site 
of reflection for the larger critical enterprise of challenging the conceit 
of law’s neutrality and autonomy from culture. Religion is not alone in 
being able to show this truth – from their own distinctive perspective, 
scholars of Indigenous law and Aboriginal justice have pointed to this 
fact about the Canadian constitutional project (Borrows 2016, 2010; Asch 
2014; Boisselle 2010) – but it is a resource well fitted to exposing ways 
in which, as Charles Taylor put it years ago, «liberalism is also a fighting 
creed» (Taylor 1995, 249).
2.3. Indigenous Peoples, Religion, and Sovereignty
Perhaps the most intriguing and challenging recent development in 
the Canadian conversation surrounding religious freedom has been the 
opening up of the question of how general principles of religious freedom 
under the Charter interact with the particularities surrounding Indigenous 
rights, Indigenous religion, and the fundamental constitutional problem 
of unsettled sovereignty in Canada.  
The defining issue of the political and legal moment in Canada is that 
of «reconciliation» between the Canadian state and Indigenous peoples. 
Although questions of Indigenous rights, treaties, and sovereignty had 
long been before the Court and were an important dimension of Canadian 
politics for some time, the conversation around Indigenous justice issues 
sharpened and intensified significantly following the report of the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (Truth and Reconciliation 
Canada 2015). The Commission’s work, and the report that it issued, 
marked an historic reckoning not only with the dark history of the use of 
residential schools in an effort to extinguish Indigenous culture (Miller 
1996), but also with the broader injustices and effects of colonialism in 
Canada. This history and its ongoing effects are the subject of increas-
ing understanding and study amongst scholars of Indigenous law and 
politics in Canada (Macklem and Sanderson 2016; Borrows and Coyle 
2017), but are rarely analyzed as a meaningful part of the story of reli-
gious difference and religious freedom in Canada (see Epp Buckingham 
2014; Moon 2014). 
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And yet religion was central in shaping the foundational relationship 
between the Canadian state and Indigenous peoples. The early colonial 
project was one in which religious missionaries played a crucial role, 
sometimes extending state power and sometimes aligning with Indigenous 
communities in advocating for the recognition of Aboriginal rights and 
sovereignty (Foster and Berger 2008). With the expansion westward of 
the Canadian state and its claims for sovereignty, the Federal government 
banned Indigenous religious rituals and practices, such as the potlatch, 
as part of its effort to consolidate political and economic control over 
Indigenous people and their territories. There is a dialectic here between 
denials of religion and denials of sovereignty, and thus between denials of 
religious freedom and aspirations to turn a desire for colonial sovereignty 
into political and constitutional fact. And one sees these links between the 
suppression and use of religion and the striving for political sovereignty 
very clearly, though tragically, in the history of the residential school sys-
tem in Canada. In a devastating project aimed at cultural extinguishment, 
the Canadian state worked with the churches in administering this system.
Indigenous communities are still, inspirationally, overcoming its ruinous 
effects, which continue to condition the political and legal relationship 
between the Canadian state and Indigenous peoples. The story of religion, 
state, and Indigenous people must be excavated and studied as a central 
part of the distinctive history – the «emotional inheritances», in Asad’s 
felicitous phrase (Asad 2003, 102) – of law and religion in Canada.
There is a robust constitutional jurisprudence in Canada dealing 
with Aboriginal and treaty rights that has arisen through section 35 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982, by which Aboriginal and treaty rights are 
«recognized and affirmed». That jurisprudence has, with a few notable 
exceptions, been disappointing for Indigenous peoples, largely because 
of the formidable evidentiary and legal burdens that s 35 has imposed 
on claimants.  Given those burdens, the history that I outlined above, 
and the close tethering between Indigenous religion and the land, it was 
perhaps unsurprising that a case would emerge that, instead, involved a 
claim for the protection of Indigenous rights and land interests through 
the general guarantee of freedom of religion pursuant to section 2(a) of 
the Charter.
That case was Ktunaxa Nation v British Columbia (Forests, Lands 
and Natural Resource Operations), 2017 SCC 54. The Ktunaxa asserted 
that the government’s approval of a large resort development project in a 
region of British Columbia called the Jumbo Valley or, for the Ktunaxa, 
Qat’muk, offended their religious freedom.  The Ktunaxa believe that 
the valley is the home of the Grizzly Bear Spirit, a figure of spiritual 
significance, and that the construction of permanent accommodations 
would drive the Grizzly Bear Spirit from Qat’muk. Proceeding with the 
development would, thus, «irrevocably impair their religious beliefs and 
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practices» (para 6). The Court euphemistically characterizes this as «a 
novel claim» (para 70). It was, in fact, a claim with radically subversive 
potential. Given the connection between Indigenous religion and the 
land (Borrows 2010), and the capacious scope of section 2(a) to that 
point, this claim had profoundly disruptive potential for the Crown use 
and control of land and its resources. Wrestling with that potential led 
the Court to novel – and troubling – doctrinal outcomes.
The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously dismissed the Ktunaxa’s 
claim. Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Rowe, writing for the majority 
of the Court, concluded that the Ktunaxa’s claim simply fell outside the 
scope of freedom of religion because they were seeking to protect not 
their beliefs and practices, but rather the Grizzly Bear Spirit itself. The 
majority explains that «the Charter protects the freedom to worship, 
but does not protect the spiritual focal point of worship» (para 71). 
Although infringements of religious freedom can be (and, in the Court’s 
jurisprudence, most commonly are) justified as reasonable limitations 
under section 1 of the Charter, this holding in Ktunaxa represented the 
first clearly articulated internal scope limitation for freedom of religion 
in Canada.  
But this particular scope limitation feels uncomfortably specific to 
Indigenous religion. For other religious traditions with which the Court 
is accustomed in its freedom of religion jurisprudence it is hard to 
imagine the government being able to adversely affect the metaphysical 
referent of their beliefs and practices (ie, God, for Jews and Christians, 
for example). By contrast, the «spiritual focal point of worship» for the 
Ktunaxa is vulnerable to state interference: the Grizzly Bear Spirit is tied 
to the land. Justice Moldaver, in separate reasons, rightly points to this 
distinguishing feature, explaining that «[f]or Indigenous religions, state 
action that impacts land can therefore sever the connection to the divine, 
rendering beliefs and practices devoid of their spiritual significance» (para 
127). For the Ktunaxa, Moldaver J explains, the protection of religious 
practices without regard to the metaphysics that lend those practices 
their meaning «amounts to protecting empty gestures and hollow rituals, 
rather than guarding against state conduct that interferes with ‘profoundly 
personal beliefs’, the true purpose of s. 2(a)’s protection» (para 130). The 
majority’s approach, therefore, «risks foreclosing the protections of s. 2(a) 
of the Charter to substantial elements of Indigenous religious traditions» 
(para 131). The majority’s approach seems to exile important dimensions 
of Indigenous religion outside the shelter of freedom of religion.  
And yet, whereas the distinctive and unruly features of this Indigenous 
claim under s. 2(a) led the majority to say something novel and troubling 
about the scope of the right, Justice Moldaver’s ultimate position says 
something equally arresting about the reasonable limitation of religious 
freedom. Although he found that the impugned state action would render 
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the Ktunaxa’s beliefs «entirely devoid of religious significance» and their 
prayers, ceremonies, and rituals would «become nothing more than empty 
words and hollow gestures» (para 133), Justice Moldaver nevertheless 
justified the government’s decision as «reasonable in the circumstances» 
(para 155). This result would seem no less troubling to the Ktunaxa, 
given the broad justificatory scope that it grants to the state: actions that 
could entirely evacuate the right to freedom of religion for the Ktunaxa 
are nevertheless judged reasonable. 
What was it about this novel claim for the protection of Indigenous 
religion that yielded these uncomfortable conclusions from both the 
majority and minority?  Justice Moldaver’s reasons suggest an answer, 
exposing the extent to which questions of sovereignty suffused the analysis 
of this freedom of religion claim in Ktunaxa. To accede to the Ktunaxa’s 
claim would allow them «to veto development over the land» and «would 
effectively transfer the public’s control of the use of over fifty square ki-
lometres of land to the Ktunaxa» (para 150). Justice Moldaver explains: 
«This placed the Minister in a difficult, if not impossible, position.  He 
determined that if he granted the power of exclusion to the Ktunaxa, 
this would significantly hamper, if not prevent, him from fulfilling his 
statutory objectives: to administer Crown land and to dispose of it in the 
public interest» (para 150).
The pivotal phrase here is «Crown land». Is Qat’muk Crown land to 
be disposed of in the public interest? That question – the status of the 
land and the sovereignty claim over it – is the irreducible political core 
of such disputes between the state and Indigenous peoples.  Although 
this core is somewhat less obvious in the majority’s decision, the way 
those reasons efface the link between land and religion suggests similar 
concerns and preoccupations. A tantalizing tell comes in the majority’s 
initial description of the facts. The majority explains that the area in 
dispute «is located in a Canadian valley in the northwestern part of the 
larger Ktunaxa territory» (para 3). Is it a «Canadian valley» or is it part 
of «Ktunaxa territory»? The shearing forces within this facially anodyne 
statement are the forces exerted by the underlying sovereignty claims 
working themselves out – seeking and resisting reconciliation – beneath 
and through the debate about freedom of religion. Imaginatively, both 
decisions begin from an assertion of state sovereignty over the land; they 
proceed from, are shaped by, and ultimately return to that imaginative 
foundation.
With this, we may detect some resonance between this developing 
issue of the treatment of Indigenous religion and the institutional or cor-
porate turn in religious freedom jurisprudence discussed earlier in this 
paper. There is an intrinsic claim about sovereignty at work in both cases, 
and freedom of religion seems to offer itself as something of a natural or 
hospitable vehicle for such claims.  As against dominant contemporary 
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understandings of religious freedom that treat its essence as a matter of 
liberty and equality, there is another story about religious freedom that is 
about jurisdictional and political pluralism (Muñiz-Fraticelli 2014; Cohen 
2017). Read against the backdrop of this story, the Ktuanxa decision is a 
provocative development in Canadian freedom of religion debates for two 
reasons: it marks out the issue of Indigenous religion and reconciliation 
as an important matter to track in the coming years, and it gestures more 
broadly to the role that religious freedom plays – perhaps genetically – in 
questioning and testing state sovereignty.
3. Conclusion
This article has examined three axes around which contemporary 
Canadian debates on freedom of religion are turning: the status and pro-
tection of group and collective religious interests; the emergence – and 
instability – of state neutrality as the governing ideal in the management 
of religious difference; and the treatment of Indigenous religions. There 
are others, to be sure, but these three represent not only key develop-
ments in this recently active field of freedom of religion in Canada, but 
also vectors of change (with all of the uncertainty and open questions that 
this involves) as we look ahead in the unfolding of jurisprudential and 
scholarly debates. But at the same time that each says something important 
about the evolution of freedom of religion in Canada, each also gestures to 
underlying currents and tensions in Canadian constitutionalism at large. 
The question of how to give regard to the collective and associational di-
mensions of social life within a constitutional logic focused on liberty and 
autonomy is a structural problem in liberal constitutionalism. The issue 
of state neutrality and its limits is one that touches on the fundamental 
question of the legitimacy and authority of constitutions. And studying 
the treatment of Indigenous religions reminds of the abiding uncertainty 
and contestation that surrounds sovereignty in Canada. In each instance, 
freedom of religion is serving as a window into the issues and dynamics 
that affect and afflict contemporary Canadian constitutional law at large. 
What is it about the constitutional protection of freedom of religion 
that gives it this diagnostic function? The distinctive ability of religious 
freedom to reveal general trends and patterns in contemporary Canadi-
an constitutionalism is not just a matter of a surge in cases on point or, 
in any straightforward way, a function of increased religious pluralism. 
The answer is more structural and intrinsic to the relationship of law 
and religion. 
In its effort to judge claims of freedom of religion, the law must adopt 
a particular vision of religion and its relationship to the political – an ap-
proach to and conception of its subject that will make religion digestible 
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within the constitutional order (Berger 2015). And yet religion as expe-
rienced and lived by individuals and communities will always overflow 
the constitutional categories and assumptions used to attempt to manage 
it legally. Religion is never just what law imagines it to be, or wishes it 
were. In terms offered by Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, «lived religion» will 
always elude and exceed «governed religion» (2015). In resisting those 
categories, assumptions, and commitments drawn from the logic of Cana-
dian constitutionalism, it makes them visible. The unruliness of religion 
within the conceits of liberal constitutionalism generates conceptual and 
doctrinal friction. And through this friction, religion displays the tensions, 
paradoxes, and instabilities that bedevil those conceits. 
Benjamin L. Berger
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